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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon, 18 August 1966)

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Far East

VIETNAM

Despite heavy monsoon rains, allied troops had several successful encounters with Communist forces. The Saigon government issued the final list of candidates for the constitutional assembly [redacted]

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[redacted] The DRV has been gradually increasing its coastal defenses. The recent rise in US aircraft losses is not attributed to any improvement in air defenses. North Vietnam apparently has not extensively implemented its program of industrial dispersal.

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Far East

VIETNAM

Despite heavy monsoon rains during the past week, allied troops had several successful encounters with Communist forces in the central highlands of Pleiku Province and on the coastal flatlands of Quang Tin Province.

US forces participating in Operation PAUL REVERE II established heavy contact with a large enemy force on 14 August in the Chu Pong Mountain area in southwestern Pleiku Province. The bulk of the Communist force apparently eluded the attempted encirclement maneuver, however, and may have taken refuge in Cambodia. Eleven allied battalions are continuing to sweep western Pleiku in an effort to trap elements of four North Vietnamese Army regiments believed to be operating in the area. Nearly 600 enemy soldiers have been killed since 1 August. In a day-long engagement on 13 August between South Vietnamese Marines and a Communist force of unknown size, 195 enemy troops were killed and five captured in Operation COLORADO/LIEN KET 52, northwest of Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province.

A reinforced battalion of US Marines landed on the beaches of Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy provinces about 100 miles east of Saigon on 16 August. This marine operation --DECK HOUSE III--is intended to provide a blocking force for US - South Vietnamese Operation TOLEDO, which began on 9 August in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. No significant contact has developed

so far in this search for some 4,450 Viet Cong troops reported to be in the area.

Viet Cong guerrillas initiated a flurry of harassing actions against allied military targets in widely separated areas of the country. Although no firm trend is yet discernible, it has been anticipated that the Communists might step up such activity prior to South Vietnam's 11 September elections, not only to intimidate voters, but also to offset the lack of any major Communist victory during the past several months.


At least one effective ambush and five mortar and small-arms attacks were conducted by the Viet Cong on 16 and 17 August against allied military targets. Also on 17 August, Viet Cong terrorists exploded a bomb at a fairground in Hue, killing 30 South Vietnamese and injuring many more.

South Vietnamese Elections

On 12 August, the Saigon government issued the final list of 542 candidates for the 108 seats in the 11 September elections for a constitutional assembly. Voluntary withdrawals contributed significantly to the high rate of attrition since 1 July, when the initial posting showed 629 principal candidates and some 100 alternates. The Central Election Review Council received only 42 complaints

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resulting from the actions of local screening boards, and decided in favor of the candidates in 28 cases. The regime is continuing its informational program to generate wide public interest in the elections and there is some evidence that it is making an impact in urban areas.

threat to break off negotiations with the government on 15 August. An ultimatum had been issued to force Premier Ky to sign an agreement meeting montagnard demands for greater autonomy. Premier Ky was reported to have signed the letter agreeing to all of FULRO's demands on 18 August. The FULRO representatives have now requested the government to allow them until 25 August to submit candidates for the montagnard seats in the constitutional assembly.

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DRV Increasing Coastal Defenses

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[redacted] a heavy-artillery defense system may be developing along the North Vietnamese coast. Most of the batteries so far detected are grouped about significant port areas and are apparently equipped with guns that range in caliber from 85-mm. to 152-mm. Defense weapons of this sort could be useful against hostile naval operations within 20 miles of the coast. There is no evidence, thus far, that the system includes surface-to-surface missiles.

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Government and FULRO Relations

A new montagnard crisis was narrowly averted last week when the dissident tribal organization, FULRO, retreated from its

US Aircraft Losses in August

The loss of 23 US planes to North Vietnamese air-defense fire during the first 15 days of August appears to be more

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closely related to an increasing attack-sortie rate over more hazardous areas than to any important improvement in North Vietnamese air defense. The air war over North Vietnam was stepped up significantly on 29 and 30 June with the attacks on the Hanoi-Haiphong area, and in the following month US aircraft losses increased correspondingly. For example, only 21 US planes were lost in 3,429 sorties over North Vietnam in June. In July, however, when the number of sorties rose to 4,370 and US aircraft attacked more heavily defended areas, 42 planes were lost. August losses thus far are comparable to those of July.

DRV Dispersal of Industry

North Vietnam's propaganda claims of a stepped-up program of industrial decentralization and dispersal to minimize vulnerability to air attack does

not appear to have been implemented extensively. The share of resources allocated to building small plants is larger this year than last, and some existing small plants have been moved out of urban areas, but there is no evidence of any intention to move the country's few large, modern industrial facilities out of the Hanoi-Haiphong area where many of them are concentrated.

The development of local industry according to Hanoi's plans will enhance self-sufficiency in rural areas that might be isolated by air attacks, and will reduce to some extent the burden on the transportation system. It is likely to result in some decline in production however, and will not eliminate the need to import machinery and raw materials needed by the food, textile, and machine building industries that constitute the core of the modern industrial sector.

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS

Limited concessions by Premier Souvanna seem to have satisfied enough of the National Assembly's demands for a greater political role to preserve the delicate balance within his government.

National Assembly members, chafing under their limited participation in the government, had served notice on Souvanna that the assembly session which convened in early August would bring sharp attacks on the government ministries as well as pressure for an enlarged and re-organized cabinet. The members reportedly wanted three vacant secretary of state positions--comparable to deputy ministers--filled. They also were pressing for the replacement of the four long-absent Pathet Lao cabinet members.

Souvanna responded by agreeing to appoint secretaries of state for finance, rural affairs, and sports and youth. However, to retain at least the facade of tripartite government, he has refused to replace the absent Communists in his cabinet.

In addition, Souvanna may accept the resignation of neutralist Minister of Interior Pheng Phongsavan, long a target of the assembly because of his leftist tendencies. Souvanna's acceptance of Pheng's resignation at this time--it has been tendered on earlier occasions--would mark the further decline of those in the Laotian Government who have

urged an accommodation with the Pathet Lao.

The increasingly powerful General Staff has declared its support of the present government and has sought to moderate assembly demands. In return, the General Staff will reportedly press for the appointment of a military figure as minister of defense. Souvanna holds this portfolio himself and is reluctant to give it to either of the two most-likely candidates--the already powerful Generals Kouprasith and Ouane. It is unlikely that he will acquiesce in the army's demand.

Meanwhile, the present rainy season has allowed government guerrilla forces to make limited gains in military operations in northern Laos. An attempt in early August to retake the area around Nam Bac north of Luang Prabang--long held by the Pathet Lao--has apparently been successful. The Communists offered little resistance to government and guerrilla forces, possibly expecting to retake the positions when the dry season begins.

In the Laotian panhandle, seasonal rains have sharply curtailed US air attacks against the Ho Chi Minh trail network.

the rains have also reduced vehicular and porter supply activity to a low level.

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NORTH KOREA DECLARES IDEOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE

North Korea has declared its independence within the world Communist movement by chiding both Peking and Moscow. The declaration came in an article marking the anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule.

The article "Let Us Defend Independence" in Pyongyang's leading party newspaper, Nodong Sinmun, on 12 August, was the culmination of a long series of moves away from a pro-Chinese policy. Although not mentioning Peking by name, the article clearly rejected recent Chinese claims for leadership of the movement and declared that one country cannot lead the world revolution or serve as its center.

Nodong Sinmun approved Moscow's call for a united front among Communist states against US actions in Vietnam. It balanced this, however, by criticizing "revisionism" and issuing a warning--by implication as much to Moscow as to Peking--that "it is impermissible to infringe on the independence of another country under the pretext of cooperation among the fraternal countries." Although clearly bidding for independence in this earlier article, Pyongyang underscored a desire for warm relations with Moscow in a subsequent editorial in Nodong Sinmun on 15 August.

Pyongyang has been moving toward warmer relations with Mos-

cow since the change of Soviet leadership in October 1964. The new Soviet leaders, in an effort to re-establish influence in Korea, offered economic and military aid and adopted a policy of moderation in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In pursuance of this policy, Premier Kosygin visited North Korea in February 1965.

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The Soviet Union also has made a major economic aid commitment. An agreement signed in Moscow on 22 June promises Soviet assistance in installing a hot and cold steel rolling mill, and in building a thermal power plant in Pukchang, an oil refinery, an ammonia plant, and other industrial projects. The agreement also envisages a significant increase in trade through 1970.

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A NEW TEAM IN PEKING

First accounts of a mammoth rally held in Peking on 18 August to celebrate the "cultural revolution" indicate that the old hierarchy, strained by the internal struggles of the past ten months, has been shaken up.

Defense Minister Lin Piao was the principal speaker at the rally. Named the "dearest comrade in arms" of Mao Tse-tung and seated at Mao's left on the platform, Lin appears to have replaced Chief of State Liu Shao-chi as the second man in the regime. Liu was present but did not speak, and was listed eighth in the line-up of attending officials. General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping also failed to participate and was sixth in the lineup. Premier Chou En-lai, the only member of Mao's inner circle whose position in the power structure seems unchanged, was listed third and sat to Mao's right.

A major surprise was the re-appearance of Chen Yun, once the party's top economic specialist, who went into limbo after bitterly criticizing "leap forward" methods in 1959. Although Chen has made a few unimportant ceremonial appearances since, this is his first appearance in many years at a turnout designed to display elite leaders.

The basis for the new line-up was probably established during the last days of the 1 to 12 August central committee plenum. Peking's accounts of the meeting and the bland communique issued at its close appear designed to convey the impression that top-level conflicts had been resolved and that all party leaders were united under Mao.

It now appears, however, that the top party conclave--the first of its kind in four years--was the scene of sharp debate. This is suggested by indications of disarray in the party press while the meetings were in session.

On 10 August the authoritative ideological journal Red Flag demanded that the "cultural revolution" focus on bringing down powerful party figures who had gone astray. A central committee decision, publicized on 8 August, had stated that errant party leaders were targets of the drive. This statement did not, however, take as strong a position as that put forward in Red Flag. An editorial in People's Daily on 11 August also did not follow the extreme line taken by Red Flag the previous day. A follow-up editorial in the People's Daily on 13 August omitted any reference to the need for attacks on important party figures.

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The 11 August issue of People's Daily was pulled off the streets in order to delete a picture story about Mao. The story appeared the next day with only minor changes, but the recall of People's Daily was unprecedented.

The entire pattern of events raises the possibility that Mao had been pushing the extreme position on dealing with errant party leaders but encountered

strong opposition from those who might have been threatened by this stand.

All indications are that the political cauldron is still bubbling in Peking and the situation at the top remains unstable. The shape of the emerging new power structure is still unclear, but it reflects shifts that could profoundly affect the course of Chinese policy.

Europe

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PREPARATIONS CONTINUE FOR LARGE WARSAW PACT EXERCISE

The Czech press is billing the week-long Warsaw Pact Exercise "Vltava"--to be held during the last half of September in southwestern Czechoslovakia--as the largest maneuver in Europe since the war by either the Warsaw group or NATO.

Czech ground and frontier troops are to be augmented during the exercise by large contingents of East German and Hungarian forces, and by the simultaneous air and rail movement of elements of several airborne and ground force divisions from the USSR. Previous exercises have occasionally featured either air, ground, or sea reinforcement from the USSR, but the first two methods have never before been combined.

In addition to such innovations as the combat use of television during the exercise, the Czechs have promised a massive parade at Ceske Budejovice after

the exercise. The parade may include the first public display in Czechoslovakia of such weapons as the FROG-7 tactical rocket or the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun. These were shown for the first time in Moscow last November and were also in the Warsaw parade last month.

As in the case of last year's major exercise, "October Storm," the Warsaw Pact governments probably intend their heavy advance publicity to minimize public apprehension over the military activity as well as to achieve an optimum propaganda impact. An additional consideration this year is the desire to stress the Hungarian Army's recovery from the effects of the revolt ten years ago. To emphasize this point, Moscow has apparently decided not to include the Soviet forces in Hungary in the "Vltava" exercise.

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MOSCOW PRESSES DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN TO ISOLATE US

Moscow is using the issues of Vietnam and European security to mount an increasingly broad diplomatic campaign aimed at arousing international opposition to US policies.

Soviet ambassadors have warned their host governments of the gravity of the situation in Vietnam and, depending on the inclination of the government, have encouraged them to urge restraint on the US (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, and Mexico) or to criticize it openly (e.g., Cyprus, India, and Somalia). The Soviets also emphasized the growing danger of the Vietnam war to UN Secretary General Thant in the hope of getting him to join in bringing pressure on the US.

At the same time, the Russians are continuing their efforts to keep the question of European security open as a means of exploiting Western disunity. They are dangling the prospect of an East-West detente to induce Western European countries to press Washington and Bonn to abandon plans for a West German role in NATO nuclear sharing.

Without committing itself to any course of action, Moscow is encouraging the impression that it is willing to engage in


fruitful discussions of outstanding East-West issues, and that US "aggressive" policy in Vietnam and Europe is the only obstacle to such discussions. A Soviet demarche on European security, made last week to the British foreign secretary, is part of this effort. The Soviet chargé in London sought to impress the foreign secretary with Soviet "sincerity and flexibility" on European security. Soviet propaganda also is stressing Moscow's willingness to discuss this question, but has not clearly defined when or with whom. The Soviets have made clear, however --most recently in Premier Kosygin's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 3 August, the day of the demarche to London--that the existence of "two German states" within their present borders is to be a point of departure, not discussion, for any talks on the subject.

Despite the diplomatic activity capitalizing on the Vietnam and European security questions, there is no sign that Moscow is preparing any constructive initiative. In their discussions on Vietnam, Soviet diplomats have been quick to disclaim that Moscow has any competence to act toward ending the conflict.

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NEW SOVIET TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

The USSR has revised its list of areas closed to travel by foreigners. The revision represents the first official change in travel restrictions since August 1959.

[REDACTED]

With the changes, 23 percent of Soviet territory is now officially closed as compared to 26.5 percent before. Although the newly closed areas are less extensive than those opened, they are of greater strategic significance.

The Taymyr Peninsula, Severnaya Zemlya, and western Chukhotsk National Okrug have been opened,

[REDACTED]

the closing of the city of Magadan is likely to have the effect of keeping the whole of Magadan Oblast closed.

Several large cities have been declared open, most notably Novosibirsk and Kazan. In addition, a number of places and routes within closed areas in the Baltic Republics, Ukraine, and Caucasus are open to "foreign tourists," or accessible via Intourist vehicles.

Many of the newly closed areas include installations of great military significance.

[REDACTED]

the Baltic - White Sea Canal, Lake Onega, and the Lena River north of Yakutsk. Saratov, Kirov, Angarsk, and Okhotsk have been added to the list of closed cities.

Many of the previously closed areas have been carried over without change. Border regions where concentrations of ground forces are located remain secure from the eyes of foreigners, as do the newer industrial centers such as Gorky, Kuybyshev, and the Urals [REDACTED]

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Altogether, there has been neither a drastic change in policy on travel by foreigners nor a relaxation of the security system

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TITO MOVES AGAINST LIBERAL CRITICS IN YUGOSLAVIA

By arresting archcritic Mihajlo Mihajlov and suppressing the philosophical journal Praxis, the Yugoslav regime has again demonstrated that domestic critics will not be permitted to challenge the Communist Party's fundamental authority. The regime has acted with restraint, however, in an attempt to minimize adverse reaction both at home and abroad.

Mihajlov first got into trouble last year because of his articles criticizing the lack of literary freedom in the Soviet Union. Arrested but freed on appeal, he has since bombarded the Western press with articles designed to embarrass the Yugoslav regime and to publicize himself as a second Djilas. He recently scheduled a meeting of his followers to found a new opposition journal. The meeting was announced in an open letter to Tito which denounced the one-party system and challenged Tito to prove that Yugoslavs are free in practice as well as in theory.

The regime's handling of the case has been adept so far. Initially, the security authorities only detained Mihajlov and allowed the meeting to take place. Indirect official pressure resulted in very small attendance, however, and was intended to expose Mihajlov as a radical without significant support.

This careful handling was prompted by the regime's sensitivity to Western criticism particularly now when Western support is

needed for the country's economic reform. An anti-Western and anti-American line is nevertheless emerging in semiofficial criticism, the Yugoslav press having accused Mihajlov of being an American agent and accepting large sums of money from the West. Should Mihajlov continue his activities, the regime may link him to foreign intelligence circles.

Although less publicized in the West, the Praxis group actually presents the regime with a more serious challenge, for they want to reform the party from within. The group emphasizes the humanistic aspects of Marxism and urges greater consideration of the individual, a line the party theoretically could accept.

The growing popularity of Praxis--when the regime wants to restrain the liberals after the fall of the conservative Rankovic--probably led to its suppression. There is evidence, however, that the group will continue its efforts, possibly by publishing in Filozofia, the quarterly of the Croatian Philosophical Society. The group also may expand its editorial board to include philosophers from Belgrade, thus broadening its national base.

In any event, the Praxis group, with its carefully reasoned criticisms and its willingness to bend to pressure without abandoning its precepts, continues to attract adherents. As a result, the regime may ultimately find it necessary to carry its liberalization policy further than it had planned.

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Middle East - Africa

SYRIA AND ISRAEL CLASH AGAIN

The increasingly belligerent posture adopted by both Israel and Syria in the wake of the 15 August border clash may lead to further and perhaps more serious exchanges.

The latest incident, in which two Syrian MIGs were shot down, apparently began when an Israeli patrol boat ran aground close to the eastern shoreline of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) after firing on Syrian positions. Although Israel claims sovereignty over the Sea, Israeli boats had for several years refrained from approaching closer than about 250 meters to the shore.

Syria has long been the most militantly anti-Israel of the Arab states. It has actively supported the Fatah terrorists by providing training facilities and a propaganda outlet, in contrast to Lebanon and Jordan, whose governments have opposed terrorist operations. Following the 15 August incident, Syrian authorities stated that Syria would no longer complain to the United Nations, but would counter further Israeli "provocations" by striking inside Israel.

In recent months, Israel has adopted a harder line toward Syria regarding raids into Israel by

Fatah terrorists. On 14 July, in retaliation for a series of border incidents, Israeli planes destroyed equipment at the site of the Syrian water diversion project in the area east of the Sea of Galilee. In the past, Israeli troops had made reprisal raids against alleged Fatah bases in Lebanon and Jordan, but this was the first time that Fatah actions drew Israeli retaliation directly against Syria.


In a 12 August speech, Israeli Chief of Staff Rabin warned that Israel would continue to hold Syria responsible for Fatah activities and implied immediate retaliation. Following the 15 August incident, Rabin authorized "hot pursuit" in the event of another air clash.

Even if Damascus should decide to curtail Fatah activities, it is possible that local Syrian commanders on the Israeli border would permit--or even encourage--infiltrators in direct contradiction of orders from Damascus.

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DETERIORATION CONTINUES IN CONGO (KINSHASA)

The security situation in the Congo (Kinshasa) continues its slow but steady decline.

The Katangan unit that left its post in the northeastern Congo three weeks ago apparently has arrived in Kisangani and rebellious Katangan troops in the city now may number as many as 2,700 men.

Available Congolese Government troops are no match for them, and the small mercenary unit in Kisangani probably would also be reluctant to interfere. The Katangans have the option of trying to move south toward Tshombé's Katanga redoubt, or of staying in Kisangani and exploiting their strong bargaining position.

If they go south, they will broaden the area being distracted and demoralized by the mutiny, with consequent hampering of the government's campaign and further weakening of its hold on the eastern Congo. If the government should try seriously to stop them--for instance, by harassing them en route

it would add one more disruptive

element. The chances of halting the Katangan movement, moreover, would be minimal.

the departure of the Katangans and the widespread desertions of government troops leaves a vacuum which could easily be filled by the rebels who remain in the region.

Meanwhile, Belgium is taking a cautious attitude toward high-level talks with Mobutu. Before proceeding, Brussels insists that there be evidence of a genuine interest on the part of the Congolese in resolving outstanding issues. Specifically the Belgians are looking for friendly gestures from Mobutu in the disputes over the assistance Sabena has been furnishing to Air Congo and over Belgium's educational assistance program. Brussels appears willing to make limited concessions regarding certain Belgian economic interests, but continues to look toward an over-all reduction of its involvement in the Congo. It hopes to accomplish this by developing a multilateral aid program and by restricting the role of the Belgian military to advisory functions only.

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NIGERIA'S FUTURE STILL UNCERTAIN

The first round of what are likely to be involved and prolonged talks on future regional relationships ended in Lagos late last week. Representatives have returned to their home regions to assess their bargaining power and prepare for the second round, scheduled for the end of this week. Meanwhile, the tribal sorting-out of the army is under way, with the return of eastern troops from units in the North and the repatriation of northern troops who had been serving in the East.

During the first round of talks, easterners reportedly tried unsuccessfully to pressure fence-sitting mid-westerners to join them in supporting a secessionist position.

Although northern delegates to the consultations have so far been counseling moderation, separatist feelings are also running high in the North. In a 15 August conversation with the US consul in Kaduna, the secretary to the northern military government said he saw no prospect for future close association with the East. He indicated, for the first time, that any continuing ties would have to add up to something looser than a federation, and he seemed prepared to accept the destruction of Nigeria's international identity.

At present, however, some prominent northerners are evidently still arguing against such a breakup. Western Nigeria's Yorubas, led by their Chief Awolowo, who clearly hopes to emerge

on top of a continuing federation, are also endeavoring to check the strong separatist currents emanating from the East and North.

The troop exchanges should cut down on the possibility of tribal violence within the army units but will most probably lead to the army's further deterioration as a national force. Eventually all Hausa soldiers will probably have to be returned to the North, including the contingent at Ikeja barracks outside Lagos. Although Supreme Commander Gowon continues to return there for safety each night, he evidently still has only limited control over its hard-core northern elements who largely brought him to power.


The return of the eastern troops to Enugu has given eastern military governor Ojukwu an independent power base should he decide to break from the federation. He can count on a well-armed, all-Ibo battalion in any future confrontation with Gowon, whose authority he still has not formally acknowledged.

A major question is whether Ojukwu has sufficient regional backing to make such a move. He has already been acting with considerable independence and can be expected to cooperate with the provisional central government only as it serves eastern interests. His independence has made it difficult for Gowon to consolidate his shaky regime by bringing leading citizens from all over the country into the Executive Council.

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YEMENI PRESIDENT'S RETURN BRINGS CRISIS

President Sallal has returned to Yemen from Cairo in what appears to be a desperate effort to counter growing anti-Egyptian feeling. Despite his unpopularity with Yemenis and Egyptians alike, Sallal remains the only major revolutionary figure upon whom Nasir can depend. However, his return has brought Egypt and Yemen to the brink of a major crisis.

For the last nine months Sallal had remained virtually a prisoner in Egypt. His ineffectiveness and unpopularity in Yemen had made him a symbol of the failing Yemeni revolution and a liability to Egyptian interests. Meanwhile, Premier al-Amri, a tough army officer who formerly backed Sallal to the hilt, took control in Yemen. The erosion of Amri's authority under Egyptian pressure, however, gradually forced most of the disparate elements of republican Yemen into one loosely knit, anti-Egyptian group.

As Egyptian influence slipped, Sallal, the progenitor

of the Yemeni revolution, became Nasir's chief remaining asset in Yemen politics. So long as he remained faithful to Cairo, opposition political leaders could always be discredited as "imperialists" and "reactionaries," and charged with being in secret contact with the royalist enemies.

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With complete Egyptian economic and military control of Yemen, Sallal's temporary success seems a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, Egyptian high-handedness may eventually force the republicans--particularly the tribesmen--into reconciliation with the royalists. Such a coalition, backed by battle-tested tribal warriors, could seriously contest Egyptian control.

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Western Hemisphere

CONTROVERSY OVER UNIVERSITY CONTROL IN ARGENTINA

President Ongania is continuing to wrestle with the problem of the national universities in the face of numerous faculty resignations and extensive controversy over university autonomy.

Ongania had hoped to reopen the University of Buenos Aires and several other national universities--closed since the regime's 29 July declaration that their operation would be subject to direct federal control--on 16 August. However, the mass resignations that followed the closing of the universities have left several faculties of the University of Buenos Aires with greatly reduced teaching staffs. This, combined with continued public concern over the changes and the possibility of student demonstrations, has apparently led the government to postpone their reopening until 22 August. The additional time will be used by the government to explain its university policy to the public and to permit new university officials, appointed on 12 August, to establish themselves in their jobs.

Argentina's eight national universities, traditionally governed by a board composed of faculty, students, and alumni, have been autonomous in their operations. By tradition, autonomy has also meant that uni-

versity campuses were outside the government's legal jurisdiction and off limits for police. While the end of autonomy may lead to more scholastic discipline and to less student control over university affairs, faculty members fear that government control will also mean the end of teaching freedom and will put pressure on them to adhere to the conservative, church-oriented beliefs of some government leaders.

The ending of university autonomy has been the most controversial of the reforms yet attempted by Ongania. The extent of foreign and domestic criticism and the high number of faculty resignations apparently surprised the government, forcing it to defend its position. President Ongania, for his part, has assured the public that he does not intend to prevent or restrict academic freedom. However, several key cabinet members and government advisers are known to believe that the faculty and students of the University of Buenos Aires include Communists who must be "weeded out." Pressures from right-wing circles in the regime could well mean that the government will exert a great degree of control over the curriculum as well as over the operations of the schools.

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POLITICAL TENSIONS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

President Joaquin Balaguer on 11 August called for a vaguely defined political truce and asked for legislation banning certain types of political activity for almost two years. The proposed law, according to Balaguer, permits routine party business and "merciless" censure of his government.

The intent of the proposed law is obscure. The US ambassador feels that opposition leader Juan Bosch's party is the major target. Balaguer, however, said it was aimed at curbing extreme leftist-inspired political violence and agitation. A presidential aide described the law as a psychological deterrent to the regime's opponents. Whatever its intent, the proposal's loose wording would risk its use by local military and police elements to justify throttling the left--which in turn might increase its attacks on the regime.

The reaction of the left to the proposed law is mixed.

Bosch himself asserts that Balaguer is out to destroy his party. Extremists have characterized the proposal as dictatorial, and have challenged Balaguer to enforce it.

The fatal shooting of a popular former rebel commando leader on 12 August has added to political tension. Although the extreme left may have been re-

sponsible, the popular assumption in Santo Domingo is that he was gunned down by right wingers. The incident touched off outbursts of violence, aggravated by the calculated terrorism of the Communist-oriented 14th of June Movement, which has recently stepped up agitation. The police, however, effectively contained the disturbances.

Bosch has indicated to US officials that he is very disturbed and apprehensive over recent developments. He alleges that he backs the government, but feels Balaguer is abusing many of the regime's supporters. Moreover, Bosch has overdrawn the gravity of the present situation by repeating elaborate tales of right-wing conspiracy--hoping perhaps to encourage the retention of the Inter-American Peace Force.

Meanwhile, incipient tension between Balaguer and the military was eased by an 11 August presidential statement voicing "absolute confidence" in top military leaders. In an apparently related move, plans for a military reorganization were postponed. Balaguer's actions, at least for the present, have put an end to intense rumors of an imminent military command shake-up. Nevertheless, Balaguer is intent on implementing ambitious military reforms which could upset civil-military harmony.

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